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Introduction
The joint venture is a widely used method of corporate expansion in general business, as
well as in the real estate area. The international joint venture provides U.S. companies
with opportunities to access overseas markets. This is especially true in countries that
prohibit acquisitions of real estate by foreign investors or have related restrictions for
direct foreign investment.
However, despite their importance, joint ventures in general, and international real
estate joint ventures in particular, have not been rigorously examined thus far. The
purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of both domestic and international real
estate joint ventures on the value of U.S. ﬁrms, and to analyze the factors that may
explain any abnormal returns. To be consistent with the literature, an international real
estate joint venture is deﬁned as one in which at least one partner is from a foreign
country and the real estate properties involved in the joint venture are located in the
foreign country. Because of the immovability of real estate, international real estate joint
ventures bear more political and economic risk than the normal foreign direct investment.
However, as with foreign investment in general, there may be diversiﬁcation beneﬁts.
Conﬂicting results about the wealth effects of joint ventures have been previously
reported in the literature. Therefore, this study will provide new evidence on this
important issue by expanding the joint venture analysis into the international area and by
extending the time period of the analysis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the previous
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Abstract. This study examines the wealth effect of international versus domestic real estate
joint ventures on the U.S. participating ﬁrm’s shareholders. This is done using traditional
event study methodology for real estate joint venture announcements. The results suggest
that domestic real estate joint ventures generally result in a signiﬁcant increase in the ﬁrm’s
value, while international real estate joint ventures usually have a much less signiﬁcant to
nonsigniﬁcant wealth impact. This may be due to the immovability of real properties in
foreign countries and the large amount of initial investment in real estate that increase both
political and economic risks for international real estate joint ventures. This study also ﬁnds
that hotel joint ventures generally have a weaker wealth effect than non-hotel real estate
joint ventures.studies on the impacts of domestic general business joint ventures on shareholders’
wealth. Section three discusses international general business joint ventures. The fourth
section reports on the previous studies about the wealth effect of real estate joint
ventures. The ﬁfth section describes the methodology and data used in this study. Section
six presents the results, and the ﬁnal section contains a summary and conclusions.
Domestic Joint Ventures
Joint ventures are the pooling of resources by two or more ﬁrms to form a new legal
entity. The original management of the parent ﬁrms remains intact under a joint venture
(McConnell and Nantell, 1985). Darrough and Stoughton (1989) conclude that the two
most important features of joint ventures are joint control of resources by investors and
synergies based on the strategic exploitation of comparative advantages. Harrigan (1985)
presents three basic motives for joint ventures: 1) to augment internal strengths by
concentrating resources in areas where the ﬁrm is a leader; 2) to enhance the competitive
ability of the ﬁrm; and 3) to focus on strategic beneﬁts. However, Hennart (1988) argues
that the motive for joint ventures is to minimize transaction costs. In the studies of
domestic real estate joint ventures, acquisition of capital would seem to be one of the
primary motives (Berger and Friedman, 1977).
Research results on the wealth effects of joint ventures support the synergy hypothesis.
The synergistic gains are the value created by the combination due to economies of scale,
more efﬁcient management, the combination of complementary resources, the
exploitation of market power, etc. McConnell and Nantell (1985) examined 210 joint
ventures over the 1972–79 period and ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive two-day cumulative
abnormal return (CAR) of 2.15%. They conclude that these premiums are similar to
those in mergers.
The empirical results on the announcement effect for real estate joint ventures are
mixed. Ravichandran and Sa-Aadu (1988) report that the two-day announcement period
return for a sample of seventy-two ﬁrms over the period 1972 through 1983 is 0.76%. The
authors pointed out that three basic characteristics of real estate markets might
contribute to the signiﬁcant abnormal returns: 1) the existence of asymmetric informa-
tion and the lack of a standardized product in real estate markets caused by the local
nature of the markets; 2) the importance of the sparse managerial expertise in real
property management; and 3) the presence of anchor tenants for commercial real
properties. Elayan (1993) ﬁnds even higher abnormal returns of 1.183% (signiﬁcant at the
1% level) for the two-day announcement period. However, Corgel and Rogers (1987)
identiﬁed twenty-four real estate joint ventures occurring from January 1979 through
December 1985 and ﬁnd that the announcement of real estate development joint ventures
was not linked to signiﬁcantly positive or negative price reactions, but there were
substantial variations across ﬁrms.
Results from the previous studies on domestic real estate joint ventures suggest that
further evidence on the wealth impact generated by real estate joint venture
announcements is deﬁnitely needed.
International Joint Ventures
International joint ventures are those that involve at least one foreign partner. U.S. ﬁrms
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accessible, to exploit the imperfections in factors and product markets, and to exploit
oligopolisic advantages gained in the domestic market (Lee and Wyatt, 1990). There are
several empirical studies on the value of international asset diversiﬁcation through joint
ventures and the evidence provided by these studies is conﬂicting. Lummer and
McConnell (1990) report synergistic gains to U.S. partners in international joint ventures
and discuss how international joint ventures generally increase the value of the ﬁrm.
However, after the examination of 110 international joint ventures, Finnerty,J Owers and
Rogers (1986) do not ﬁnd evidence supporting the synergy effect hypothesis.
Furthermore, Lee and Wyatt (1990) report signiﬁcant negative abnormal returns to 109
U.S. ﬁrms involved in international joint ventures during the period 1974 through 1986
and their results indicate that only joint ventures with ﬁrms from less developed countries
have non-negative effects on shareholders’ wealth. Jensen’s agency cost of free cash ﬂow
was hypothesized as explaining this phenomenon. That is, international joint ventures
may represent overinvestment that expands the manager’s control over real properties in
foreign countries at the expense of shareholders’ wealth.
However, two recent studies indicate that U.S. companies may realize signiﬁcant
positive abnormal returns from establishing international joint ventures with either less
developed countries or developed countries. In a study of Japan–U.S. joint ventures by
Crutchley, Guo and Hansen (1991), both U.S. and Japanese shareholders beneﬁt, on
average, from forming international joint ventures. The average percentage gain in stock
price is about 1% at the announcement. The gains are larger when the home currency is
relatively strong, which indicates that overcoming restrictions on cross-border ﬂows of
goods and services may be a motive for international joint ventures. Similarly, Chen, Hu
and Shieh (1991) report signiﬁcant positive abnormal returns (0.52%) on the announce-
ment day for U.S. ﬁrms in eighty-eight U.S.–China joint ventures from 1979 to 1990. The
positive wealth gains are found to be negatively related to the size of the foreign
investment (ﬁrms making small investments in China have the option of expansion if
future opportunities arise). Meanwhile, these ﬁrms’ losses are limited to the small size of
their investments. Therefore, the developmental risk for these ﬁrms is reduced.
However, none of the previous studies regarding international joint ventures is
restricted to the real estate assets. Some unique characteristics of real estate might change
the wealth effect of international joint ventures. For example, the immovability of real
property and the large size of initial investment required in real estate markets bring more
political as well as economic risks to international real estate joint ventures, compared to
international joint ventures in general. These disadvantages might reduce or even
outweigh the beneﬁts from international diversiﬁcation. The relevant empirical evidence
might be helpful to understand this important issue.
Data and Methodology
Data
This study covers the period from 1975 through 1990. Announcements of real estate joint
ventures were found in the Wall Street Journal Index, Funk & Scott, and the Yearbook of
Corporate Mergers, Joint Ventures, and Corporate Policy. Observations were included in
the sample if sufﬁcient data were available on the CRSP NYSE/AMEX or OTC tapes for
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during the event period, such as dividend announcements, senior management changes,
etc. However, most announcements of real estate joint ventures did not provide
information about transaction size. To exclude the announcements without transaction
size information would substantially reduce the sample size. A total of eighty-one U.S.
ﬁrms participating in real estate joint ventures were identiﬁed: ﬁfty-three with domestic
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Exhibit 1
Joint Ventures by Classiﬁcation and Property Type
Domestic Domestic Int’l Int’l
Year Hotel Non-Hotel Hotel Non-Hotel
1975 1 0 0 0
1976 0 0 0 0
1977 0 1 0 1
1978 0 3 1 1
1979 4 3 1 2
1980 4 0 0 1
1981 2 4 1 0
1982 2 1 1 0
1983 1 4 1 0
1984 2 2 0 0
1985 0 0 3 0
1986 0 2 3 0
1987 1 5 1 0
1988 1 4 2 4
1989 0 2 4 0
1990 0 4 0 1
Total 18 35 18 10
Exhibit 2














*country classiﬁed as developed by the IMF (1984) economic status
classiﬁcationjoint ventures and twenty-eight with international joint ventures (thirty-six with hotel
joint ventures and forty-ﬁve with non-hotel joint ventures). A breakdown of events by
year and domestic versus international/hotel versus non-hotel status is contained in
Exhibit 1 and the countries of foreign partners are shown in Exhibit 2.
Methodology
Abnormal returns for the joint venture partner were computed using the standard event
study methodology deﬁned in Brown and Warner (1985) with market model-adjusted
returns. The pre-event period was taken to be days (2244, 221) and the event period was
taken to be days (220, 15). The sample was split into two different subsamples. One is
domestic versus international joint ventures. Because of the unique characteristics of real
estate investment (immovability of real property and large amount of initial investment),
international real estate joint ventures bear more risks than other types of international
joint ventures. Thus, it is hypothesized that the wealth effect of international real estate
joint ventures is weaker than that for domestic real estate joint ventures.
The other subsample is hotel versus non-hotel joint ventures. Although hotels own and
use real properties, some researchers and many institutional real estate investors feel that
hotels are more like an operating business, and not representative of real estate in general.
Hotels are generally classiﬁed into the lodging industry rather than the typical real estate
industry. In addition, from an operations point of view, hotel managers have few
similarities with real estate asset managers. Therefore, two of the three sources of
economic gain for real estate joint ventures suggested by Ravichandran and Sa-Aadu
(1988), that is, sparse managerial skills and anchor tenants, are not quite as relevant for
hotel joint ventures. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the wealth effect of hotel joint
ventures is weaker than that for non-hotel joint ventures.
Further Tests
In order to examine the factors that may contribute to the cumulative abnormal returns
(CAR), if any, for the entire sample (all real estate joint ventures) and international real
estate joint ventures, the following variables were used in a second-stage cross-sectional
regression analysis:
· Type of partner. Kau and Sirmans (1985) describe a real estate joint venture as a
ﬁnancing agreement in which the borrower is typically a real estate developer
with considerable technical knowledge and the lender has the capital that the
developer usually lacks. A ﬁnancial institution, as a partner, involved in a real
estate joint venture might indicate the combination of complementary resources
and have positive impact on shareholders’ wealth.
· Type of property. If a property involved in a joint venture is a hotel property, it
may not have a signiﬁcant positive impact on CAR, because of reasons stated
previously.
· Type of joint venture. The immovability of real property and the large amount of
initial investment normally required indicate that international real estate joint
ventures may contribute much less to the CAR for the entire sample than the
domestic real estate joint ventures contribute to the entire sample’s CAR.
WEALTH EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC vs INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES 353· Type of country. As mentioned above, Lee and Wyatt (1990) report that only
international joint ventures with less developed countries have non-negative
wealth effects. However other studies suggest that the type of country (developed
or less developed) the partners come from does not matter. Usually less
developed countries lack political and economic stability, thus an international
real estate joint venture associated with a less developed country is hypothesized
to have a less signiﬁcant positive impact on the wealth of U.S. shareholders.
· Tax considerations. The 1986 U.S. tax law revision substantially changed the
depreciation rules and the tax treatment for capital gains. Scholes and Wolfson
(1990) argue that after 1986 tax reform foreign investors should ﬁnd investment
in the U.S. more attractive than before. Therefore, it may have a signiﬁcant
impact on the CAR for international real estate joint ventures.
· Exchange rates. Chen et al. (1991) report that the economic gains for
international joint ventures are larger when the home currency is relatively
strong. The same kind of relationship between economic gains and the strength
of U.S. currency is assumed for international real estate joint ventures.
The second-stage cross-sectional regression analysis has the following form:
CARi5ai1bi1F1bi2H1bi3I1ei , (1)
where the CARi is the cumulative abnormal return on days (21, 0) associated with
announcement  i, F is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if a ﬁnancial institution
is involved in the joint venture and the value 0 otherwise. F is to estimate the effect of
participation by ﬁnancial institutions; as suggested by Berger and Friedman (1977),
acquisition of capital is one of the primary motives for domestic real estate joint ventures.
H is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the property involved in the joint venture
is a hotel and 0 otherwise. I is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if one partner in
the joint venture is a foreign company and 0 otherwise, and ei is a random term.
For the international joint ventures, the regression model includes the following
additional independent variables: I is replaced by D, a dummy that takes the value of 1 if
the foreign partner is from a developed country and 0 otherwise. T is a new dummy that
takes the value of 1 if the joint venture is formed after the U.S. 1986 tax reform act and 0
otherwise; T would measure the impact of the 1986 tax reform on the abnormal returns
for international real estate joint ventures. Finally, E, is an exchange-rate variable that
measures the strength of U.S. currency. Similar to Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), E is




where e e represents how much foreign currency one U.S. dollar is worth, and is e ¯ the mean
of e over the sample period.
Results
Exhibit 3 presents the average abnormal returns (AR) for the U.S. ﬁrms in the various
types of real estate joint ventures examined in this study. For the all real estate (hotel and
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that found by Ravichandran and Sa-Aadu (1988) and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The AR
of day 21 is 0.88% (signiﬁcant at the 1% level). The results of this study thus support the
conclusions of McConnell and Nantell (1985) that shareholders reap the wealth gains
from joint ventures. However, the results do not support Corgel and Rogers’ (1987)
ﬁndings that deny the wealth effects of real estate joint ventures. Their ﬁndings may be
limited due to their small sample size.
The domestic real estate joint ventures in this study had an AR for day 21 of 1.12%
(signiﬁcant at the 1% level) and a two-day (21,0) CAR of 1.11% (signiﬁcant at the 5%
level) to partners, whereas the international real estate joint ventures had an insigniﬁcant
positive two-day CAR of 0.26%. The results, therefore, support the hypothesis that
international real estate joint ventures generally have a smaller wealth impact on the
value of U.S. participating ﬁrms than domestic real estate joint ventures do. But the
results are inconsistent with ﬁndings reported in Lee and Wyatt (1990) that international
joint ventures generate negative abnormal returns to U.S. partners.
The AR of day 21 for non-hotel joint ventures was 0.88% (signiﬁcant at the 5% level),
whereas for hotel joint ventures it was 0.87% (signiﬁcant at the 10% level). The two-day
(21,0) CAR for non-hotel joint ventures was 0.91%, while for hotel joint ventures was
only 0.70%, and both were insigniﬁcant.
Exhibits 4 and 5 show the results of the cross-sectional regressions for days (21,0),
CARs for all joint ventures and international joint ventures, respectively. Although seven
different regression models were employed for the all-real estate joint ventures and
international joint ventures regressions, none of the variables were signiﬁcant at even the
10% level. However, the hotel variable had negative coefﬁcients in seven of eight cases
(Models 1, 2 and 6 for all-real estate joint ventures (Exhibit 4), and Models 1, 3, 5 and 6
for international real estate joint ventures (Exhibit 5)) and the variable for international
joint ventures had a negative coefﬁcient in many cases (Models 1, 3, 4, and 7 for all real
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Exhibit 3
CARs for Various intervals
Interval All Domestic Int’l Hotel Non-Hotel
(220, 22) .0095 2.0077 .0398 .0390 2.0144
(.74) (2.46) (1.67) (1.85) (2.80)
(22, 22) .0023 2.0006 .0079 .0053 2.0001
(.79) (2.16) (1.45) (1.10) (2.01)
(21, 21) .0088** .0112** .0042 .0087 .0088*
(2.97) (2.92) (.76) (1.81) (2.12)
(21, 0) .0082* .0111* .0026 .0070 .0091
(1.95) (2.05) (.33) (1.02) (1.55)
(0, 0) 2.0006 2.0001 2.0016 2.0018 .0003
(2.21) (2.03) (2.29) (2.37) (.08)
(1, 5) 2.0156* 2.0204* 2.0064 2.0168 2.0146
(22.36) (22.38) (2.52) (21.55) (21.57)
t-statistics for the CARs are given in parentheses.
*indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level; **indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% levelestate joint ventures (Exhibit 4)). This is consistent with the above ﬁndings that these type
of real estate joint ventures have less signiﬁcant or insigniﬁcant positive wealth effects
(Exhibit 3).
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Exhibit 4
All Joint Ventures 
Regressions: CAR Days (21, 0)
Finance Int’l
Model Intercept Institut. Hotel Joint Venture Adj. R2 F
1 .0075 .0134 2.0003 2.0089 2.024 .372
(.68) (.85) (2.02) (2.57)
2 .0055 .0138 2.0027 — 2.015 .400
(.53) (.88) (2.19)
3 .0076 .0134 — 2.0088 2.011 .565
(.76) (.86) (2.60)
4 .0113 — .0010 2.0095 2.021 .197
(1.11) (.07) (2.61)
5 .0043 .0137 — — 2.003 .773
(.52) (.88)
6 .0091 — 2.0022 — 2.012 .024
(.96) (2.15)




Regressions: CAR Days (21, 0)
Finance Developed Ex After
Model Intercept Institut. Hotel Country Rate Tax Adj. R2 F
1 .0269 2.0005 2.0309 .0246 2.0123 2.0286 2.01 .947
(1.03) (2.02) (21.33) (1.07) (2.47) (21.24)
2 .0223 .0080 — — 2.0010 2.0326 .04 .700
(1.28) (.28) (2.04) (21.41)
3 .0104 2.0025 2.0315 .0292 2.0058 — 2.04 .779
(.46) (2.09) (21.34) (1.28) (2.23)
4 2.0080 .0055 — .0250 .0025 — 2.08 .423
(2.43) (.19) (1.08) (.10)
5 .0096 — 2.0311 .0291 2.0048 — .01 1.088
(.47) (21.39) (1.30) (2.21)
6 .0236 — 2.0272 — .0015 — 2.02 .757
(1.36) (21.21) (.07)
7 2.0068 — — .0251 .0005 — 2.03 .645
(2.40) (1.11) (.02)Summary and Conclusions
This study has investigated the impact of real estate joint ventures on the participating
U.S. ﬁrm’s shareholder wealth. The results for ‘‘all’’ and ‘‘domestic’’ joint ventures
indicate that real estate joint ventures generally result in a signiﬁcant increase in the ﬁrm’s
value. This ﬁnding is in agreement with that found by McConnell and Nantell (1985) and
Ravichandran and Sa-Aadu (1988), but it is inconsistent with that found by Corgel and
Rogers (1987).
The results of this study also suggest that international real estate joint ventures
usually have a much less signiﬁcant positive wealth impact on U.S. participating ﬁrms’
shareholders than domestic real estate joint ventures do. The possible reason is that the
immovability of real properties in foreign countries and the large size of initial
investments required partially offset, even outweigh the beneﬁts from international asset
diversiﬁcation. This ﬁnding is consistent with that reported by Lummer and McConnell
(1990), Crutchley et al. (1991) and Chen et al. (1991), but it contradicts the results found
by Lee and Wyatt (1990). The evidence that domestic real estate joint ventures generate
signiﬁcant positive abnormal returns while international real estate joint ventures fail to
provide U.S. companies with signiﬁcant abnormal returns indicates that investors
perceive that investment in U.S. real estate may involve less political and economic risk
than foreign real estate investment.
The type of property also seems to matter. This study ﬁnds that hotel joint ventures
generally have weaker wealth effects than non-hotel joint ventures (compare the AR of
day 21 for hotel and non-hotel joint ventures). It may be due to Jensen’s ‘‘free cash’’
phenomenon, that is, investment in hotels simply means the further oversupply of hotels
in this country, which affects the perceptions of potential investors, or to the perceived
status of hotels as more of an operating business than a real estate investment. This
ﬁnding is consistent with our hypothesis about hotel joint ventures.
In addition, this study does not ﬁnd supportive evidence that the participation or non-
participation of ﬁnancial institutions has any signiﬁcant wealth impact on real estate
joint venture partners. This indicates that traditional ﬁnancial institutions might not be
the major funds providers for real estate joint ventures. The results of this study do not
indicate any signiﬁcant impacts of types of countries foreign partners are from, the
strength of the U.S. dollar, and the 1986 U.S. tax law revision. However, the insigni-
ﬁcantly negative regression coefﬁcients of the hotel and international joint ventures are
consistent with the ﬁndings that those types of joint ventures have less signiﬁcant or
insigniﬁcant positive wealth effects.
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